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Diaspora strategizing is becoming an important field of public policy in countries that seek to
advance development through migration. Diaspora strategies present a way of complicating inter-
pretations of development, as countries that represent different levels of development seek to
mobilize diaspora networks nonetheless. While Singapore’s diaspora strategies prioritize diaspora
knowledge networks, it bears the stamp of the country’s colonial history, postcolonial priorities and
developmental state apparatus. We suggest that these factors result in a distinctive diaspora strategy
characterized by a centralized and technocratic approach more similar to diaspora strategies found
in emerging economies. Earlier research on diaspora strategies has been concerned with assessing
successes or failures, but a more critical scholarship that questions the logics and outcomes
of diaspora strategizing is emerging. We bring the Singaporean case into dialogue with four
such critiques: first, the intellectual foundations of diaspora-centred development; second, the
hyperextension of state infrastructure for emigration and stakeholder alignment; third, the selec-
tive mobilization of the idea of diaspora; and fourth, the evidence base upon which diaspora-
centred development is predicated. Our goal is to further critical interrogation into the logics,
efficacy and sustainability of diaspora strategizing. We situate our analyses in the international
literature on diaspora knowledge mobilization.
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Introduction
With the demise of the brain drain thesis, there has arisen interest in the way migrant
communities continue to support from afar the development of their countries of origin.
As the migration and development nexus is rethought, a new area of public policy
known as ‘diaspora strategy’ has emerged. Diaspora strategies refer to initiatives by
migrant-sending states seeking to capitalize upon the potential benefits represented by
their diaspora populations. Such diaspora engagement projects promise to deliver devel-
opment opportunities through tourism, the export of ‘nostalgia goods’, remittances,
philanthropy, business networks (knowledge sharing, brokerage, mentoring, training),
investment, patronage, advocacy, volunteerism, and circular and return migration.
Diaspora strategies are commonly championed in low- and middle-income countries,
such as Armenia, India, Mexico, China, Chile, Argentina, South Africa, Jamaica, El
Salvador, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia, Ghana and Morocco. But it is important to note
that more economically advanced countries such as Canada, New Zealand, Japan,
Australia, Israel, Scotland, Ireland and Singapore also pursue diaspora strategies. On
occasion they call attention to the need to maximize remittance flows, harness the
voluntary labour provided by diaspora corps, foster diaspora investment, attract dias-
pora tourists and encourage diaspora philanthropy. But more often they focus upon the
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role of diaspora knowledge networks (DKN) as a source of global competitive advantage
and a mechanism for brokering integration into the global economy.
We focus on the city-state of Singapore to critically examine the diaspora strategies
pursued by the Singaporean state and their underlying development logics. Our purpose
is to set the Singaporean case into global relief and show how it informs wider debates
concerning the assumptions and approaches that characterize diaspora strategizing and
diaspora knowledge networks. Singapore’s ascent to the summit of the global economy
has been particularly striking. The country’s development has been guided by the
People’s Action Party (PAP) since 1959, a few years before Singapore became indepen-
dent from Britain in 1963 and from Malaysia in 1965. Under the PAP government,
Singapore pursued an export-oriented industrialization policy and built infrastructure to
entice transnational corporations (TNC) to set up branch plants in the country. Gradu-
ally it moved up the value ladder from labour-intensive low-technology manufacturing
and assembly functions (in the 1960s and 1970s), to higher value-added, capital-
intensive TNC investment in manufacturing (in the 1980s), followed by research and
development (in the 1990s), and now as a hub for global financial services (from 2000).
Nurturing and globalizing Singaporean companies abroad is becoming a development
priority for the Singaporean political leadership. Diaspora strategizing, or harnessing the
development potential and knowledge networks represented by Singaporeans abroad, is
one means through which this development vision is to be achieved (i.e., diaspora-
centred development).
While Singapore’s diaspora strategies have been underpinned by development
imperatives similar to those undergirding the diaspora strategies of other economically
advanced countries (prioritizing the mobilization of diaspora knowledge networks), it
bears the stamp of the country’s own unique colonial history, postcolonial consider-
ations, developmental state apparatus and rapid emergence as one of Asia’s most
successful economies. We suggest that these factors result in a distinctive diaspora
strategy characterized by a centralized and technocratic approach more similar to
diaspora strategies adopted by emerging economies. Earlier research on diaspora strat-
egies has been concerned with assessing the successes or failures of diaspora strategies,
but a more critical scholarship that questions the logics and outcomes of diaspora
strategizing has emerged in recent years. We bring the Singaporean case into dialogue
with four such critiques: first, the intellectual foundations of diaspora-centred develop-
ment; second, the hyperextension of state infrastructure for emigration and stakeholder
alignment; third, the selective mobilization of the idea of diaspora; and fourth, the
evidence base upon which diaspora-centred development is predicated. Our goal is to
further critical interrogation into the logics, efficacy and sustainability of diaspora
strategizing. We situate our analyses in the international literature on diaspora knowl-
edge mobilization. Our examples are from emerging economies such as China and India
that have led the mantle in leveraging on DKN to advance their developmental status,
as well as countries that are economically advanced but still aspire towards diaspora
strategies for a developmental advantage in the knowledge-based economy (e.g., Scot-
land, Ireland and Canada).
This paper is informed by the authors’ academic research on migration, development
and diaspora strategies, and one of the author’s consultancy experiences. The latter
includes convening and participating in policy conferences and workshops on diaspora
strategies and engaging with think tanks and stakeholder organizations amongst other
activities. For the case of Singapore, the other author conducted ethnographic research
and interviews with overseas Singaporeans in London from 2004 to 2005 (Ho, 2008;
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2009). In combination, the authors have conducted research on the diaspora strategies
of Armenia, China, Canada, Ireland, Latvia, Scotland and Singapore (e.g., Boyle &
Kitchin, 2008; 2011; Ho, 2011; Ho & Ley, 2014). Further informing this paper are
analyses of newspaper articles, websites and government publications about the Singa-
porean diaspora. The authors also conducted formal and informal interviews in 2012
with representatives of government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGO)
and private organizations in Singapore that interact with overseas Singaporeans. For
confidentiality reasons, these organizations will not be named unless the information
mentioned is in publicly available reports.
The next section situates the paper in the key debates on migration as development
as well as critical diaspora studies. Here we also identify four areas where diaspora
strategies might be usefully subjected to critical scrutiny. Following that we pay atten-
tion to Singapore’s evolving development strategy and the changing importance of the
Singaporean diaspora to the country. The subsequent section brings Singapore’s dias-
pora strategies into a conversation with the four areas of critique identified. We con-
clude the paper with suggestions on how our analyses inform the wider study of
diaspora strategies.
Migration as development and emerging critiques of diaspora strategies
Migration as development is traditionally associated with development agendas where
migrants’ remittances, investments and philanthropic contributions go towards reduc-
ing poverty and securing better living conditions for their families and conationals.
Diaspora communities have moulded, and are moulding, institutions and development
opportunities in their homelands. As recognition of their contributions grows, diaspora
strategizing is emerging as an important new field of public policy for countries that
have experienced significant emigration (Kuznetsov, 2006; Levitt & Jaworsky, 2007;
Gamlen, 2008a; Newland, 2010; Aikins & White, 2011; Boyle & Kitchin, 2011). Har-
nessing migration as a strategy for development in emigration countries is prompted by
the rise of migration and the transnational links that migrants continue to retain with
their homelands after moving abroad (Skeldon, 2008). These views of development
tend to focus on migration flows moving from ‘developing’ to ‘developed’ economies
(e.g., Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002; Kuznetsov & Sabel, 2006), thereby neglecting the
gradations of ‘development’ status within these categories. Diaspora strategies present a
way of complicating these interpretations of development through initiatives by coun-
tries that are at different levels of development, but seek to mobilize diaspora networks
nonetheless.
Arguments against the shortfalls of relying on remittances for development have
prompted a new emphasis on entrepreneurialism and skills mobilization within dias-
pora networks (Mullings, 2012). Such DKN, populated by emigrant subjects embodying
human and social capital, are targeted by a growing number of migrant-sending coun-
tries, including those higher up the economic value chain. Countries with ‘developed’
economies are in fact adopting diaspora-centred development similar to ‘developing’
states, albeit to harness advanced development goals such as scientific and technological
innovation and higher education and training. Alongside this, they pursue global capital
and human capital to advance their economic competitiveness. The goal is to maintain
their advantage in a competitive global knowledge-based economy where emerging
countries are fast catching up in the pecking order of manufacturing and production.
There is now a growing literature that interrogates the premises, effects and out-
comes of diaspora strategies. Some of these critical commentaries challenge state-
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sponsored definitions of national belonging and the politics of obligation (Mohan, 2006)
or highlight the elided migrant histories that do not correspond to the state’s vision of
diaspora (Mani & Varadarajan, 2005). Others problematize the neoliberal overtones and
governmentality techniques driving diaspora strategies, the highly selective ways in
which these strategies mobilize globalizing entrepreneurial subjects (Larner, 2007;
Ragazzi, 2009; Mullings, 2012) or the asymmetrical spaces of development that arise
when diaspora strategies target emigrants based mainly in a network of global and
globalizing cities (Ho, 2011). Despite the hype associated with diaspora knowledge
networks, their effectiveness has been questioned in several ways including the nature
of the networks and tangibility of their activities, the sustainability of their membership
base, and the ability of conditions in the country of origin to complement the potential
presented by DKN (Meyer, 2011).
In this paper, we contribute to this emerging critical literature by abstracting from
international experience four particular areas of concern. We pose these four areas of
concern in terms of somewhat provocative statements to set them into sharp relief.
These questions will be revisited later in this paper where we examine them against
the case of Singapore. By critically examining the logics and effects of development
imperatives underpinning the Singapore’s diaspora strategies, we also use the Singa-
porean case to qualify, fortify and extend frameworks that offer critical readings of
diaspora strategies.
First, notwithstanding the rich intellectual history of Development Studies, to date
diaspora-centred development lacks firm theoretical bases and is implemented oppor-
tunistically by migrant-sending states at the prompting of global development agencies.1
Policy makers tend to deploy concepts such as human capital, social networks, knowl-
edge economies and DKN carelessly when formulating diaspora engagement policies.
Inasmuch as there are strong scholarly advocates of DKN (e.g., Turpin et al., 2008), other
scholars view diaspora strategizing more circumspectly (e.g., Seguin et al., 2006; Cao,
2008; Meyer, 2011; Mullings, 2011). Meyer (2001: 95), for example, acknowledges that
there is a lack of consensus concerning the assumptions on which human capital
calculations should be based, and while social networks activate skills, studies suggest
these arise from an ‘unplanned convergence of elements’ (2001: 103) rather than
purposeful diaspora strategizing. Seguin et al. (2006) also highlight empirical gaps in
comparative assessments on how knowledge mobilization can be best fostered by
countries through diaspora strategizing. Furthermore, skills can be notoriously difficult
to define, such as in cases where professionals experience deskilling after emigrating
(e.g., Bauder, 2003; McGregor, 2008). Separately, in a recent study of the return
migration outcomes accompanying Jamaica’s diaspora strategizing, Mullings (2011)
suggests that entrenched prejudices in the local labour market ‘challenges the possibility
of human capital enhancement that state-enabled diaspora strategies promise’ (2001:
37). Deliberations like these lead us to consider in this paper whether the intellectual
vision articulated by the Singaporean political leadership and its implementation is
compatible with the country’s political norms and societal culture. This affects the
viability and sustainability of diaspora strategies that policy makers formulate and the
targets of significant state investments.
Second, as a type of development agenda, diaspora strategies have attracted an
excessive and undeserved level of pomp and fanfare. A series of new institutions and
projects are being built by migrant-sending states even if the diaspora constituencies
they engage are ill-defined; diaspora strategies are consuming precious resources as
blueprints and bureaucracies are imposed on diaspora populations (e.g., Mani &
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Varadarajan, 2005). Yet, the support of an appropriate range of stakeholders in sending
states must be enrolled if diaspora strategies are to be effective. Thus one may also
question if diaspora strategies attend sufficiently to the range of stakeholders who might
make or break their effectiveness, while taking into account the existing scale, history,
geography and nature of diaspora-homeland relations. We show in the case of Singa-
pore that although an extensive emigration state infrastructure has not emerged from
diaspora strategizing, the growing state centralization of diaspora strategizing sidelines
other stakeholders.
Third, diaspora strategies aim to extend national membership, rights and responsi-
bilities beyond the territory associated with the nation-state. They are often framed by
discourses that underline the importance of the overseas citizenry to the nation-state,
the bureaucratic reforms needed to address the needs and tap on the resources of
citizens abroad, and the legislative changes required to extend rights to such citizens
(Itzigsohn, 2000; Levitt & de la Dehesa, 2003; Smith & Bakker, 2005; Gamlen, 2008b).
But policy makers of diaspora strategies rarely pause to ask questions found in critical
diaspora studies: which groups should be counted as legitimate members of the dias-
pora? Is it only the first generation of emigrants or are later generations to be included?
Does the citizenship status of members of the overseas community matter? What is to
be done about those with no overt ties to a sending country but who feel a strong sense
of affinity with that country and its people? Diaspora strategies often create diaspora
groupings inasmuch as they delimit, map and quantify these communities, resulting in
inclusions and exclusions (Ho, 2011). We not only highlight such cleavages in our
discussion on Singapore but also extrapolate from these debates to consider the poten-
tial for cultivating a more inclusive definition of the Singaporean diaspora that extends
to foreigners with affinity ties to the country.
Finally, more attention needs to be paid to the type of development produced by
diaspora-centred development, which to some observers amount to an extension of
new globalized, neoliberal governmentalities (see Larner, 2007; Ragazzi, 2009). For
example, which social groups stand to win or lose from such projects (Pellerin &
Mullings, 2013)? Do diaspora strategies consolidate existing spatial inequalities and
divisions in the sending state? Or do they promote forms of development that facilitate
a cascading of benefits and opportunities to communities that are less globally mobile?
What is the socio-economic footprint of diaspora-centred development in countries of
origin? In the empirical analysis on Singapore we show that despite the intellectual
vision articulated by the political leadership, these questions remain unanswered, and
the development benefits to be derived from investing in diaspora engagement are
uncertain. Before we develop the above arguments, we set out the historical link
between migration and development in Singapore and the way this has evolved into
contemporary diaspora strategizing.
Diaspora strategies as a paradigm shift in Singapore’s development approach
Linda Low (2001) traces Singapore’s economic evolution from a developmental state
focused on inviting foreign direct investments (FDI) for industrialization and export-
oriented trade (following decolonization and its subsequent separation from the Fed-
eration of Malaya) towards a second phase that promoted regionalization. Migration
featured prominently in this second phase of Singapore’s development strategy in two
ways. First, the Singaporean state liberalized immigration policies inviting foreigners
with the desired skills set to contribute to the economy’s new foci on financial services
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and information communications technology (ICT) as well as to promote knowledge
innovation and entrepreneurship. Second, the state encouraged Singaporean businesses
and citizens to venture abroad as an extension of the Singaporean economy (Yeoh &
Willis, 1999; Bunnell et al., 2006).
This emphasis on migration as development remains in what we can refer to as a
third phase in Singapore’s developmental strategy where the link between economy
and extraterritoriality is key (Phelps, 2009). While Phelps focuses on the creation of
Singapore-led joint venture parks abroad, this paper looks at diaspora strategies as a
developmental strategy that has triggered the interest of the Singaporean political
leadership. The then Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong reportedly said during a trade
mission to the southeastern Chinese city of Xiamen:
We need to attract foreign investments and resourceful investors into Singapore to grow the
size of our gross domestic product . . . but with the limited size of the Singapore market, the
country also needs its people to invest overseas. These Singaporeans help the country to grow its gross
national product—which calculates both the income generated at home as well as abroad by its
citizens (The Straits Times, 2009a; emphasis added).
Goh’s speech underlines how the Singaporean diaspora is to be capitalized for posi-
tioning Singapore advantageously in the global knowledge economy. While Goh
emphasized entrepreneurship in this speech, the human capital of overseas Singapor-
eans are also targeted for developing strategic growth sectors in ICT, biomedical
research, human resources training and research, clean technologies, higher education
and the cultural industries. Harnessing knowledge innovation for scientific and
technological development as well as improving productivity and efficiency builds
higher-value development than the manufacturing and production industries of
yesteryear.
The total population of Singapore (amounting to 5.40 million) consists of 3.31
million citizens, 1.56 million nonpermanent residents and 531 200 permanent residents
(National Population and Talent Division et al., 2013). Less well known is the existence
of an estimated 207 000 Singaporeans living overseas (National Population and Talent
Division et al., 2013; see Table 1), the target of the Singaporean state’s diaspora strategy.
During the 1970s and 1980s emigration was viewed as a sign of disloyalty to the
newly independent nation. But rising emigration rates (Yap, 1999) coupled with the
new strategy emphasizing the internationalization of Singaporean human capital led to
Table 1. Population of overseas Singaporeans (in hundred thousands).
Year Population
2003 157.1
2004 157.8
2005 163.0
2006 168.2
2007 172.0
2008 181.9
2009 180.7
2010 184.4
2011 192.2
2012 200.0
2013 207.00
Source: NPTD, 2013.
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a change in the state’s attitudes. The transition was signalled tentatively in government
speeches initially and subsequently incorporated into the mission of a government
agency, Contact Singapore (set up in 1998), alongside its original mandate to headhunt
highly skilled foreigners for Singapore. Ad hoc initiatives for overseas Singaporeans
remained ensconced in Contact Singapore and peripheral to recruiting highly skilled
foreigners (known in local parlance as ‘foreign talent’ for a time). Meanwhile, the state’s
pro-immigration scheme has gradually created a social rift arising from animosity
towards foreigners perceived as competing with Singaporeans for jobs and housing.
Alongside this have been complaints that foreigners are sidelining talented Singapor-
eans, thus prompting emigration. The emigration of young and educated Singaporeans
is a cause of concern for the political leadership, because it affects not only the country’s
population structure but also leadership renewal. As such, in recent years the political
leadership stresses the importance of making Singapore into a ‘global talent capital’
instead. This catchphrase shifts the emphasis away from capturing ‘foreign’ talent to a
more inclusive label that includes ‘Singaporean’ talent based locally as well as abroad.
Signalling more than a shift in rhetoric, two landmark moves further formalized the
state’s diaspora strategizing. In 2004, Singaporean parliamentarians amended the con-
stitution to enable Singaporeans born overseas and Singaporean women abroad to pass
on Singaporean citizenship to their children born abroad. These changes recognize that
more Singaporeans are going and remaining overseas but Singapore still wants to retain
ties with them (Parliamentary Debates Singapore, 2004). Although the dual citizenship
restriction remains, the citizenship law changes formalized the significance of overseas
Singaporeans to the country. Later in 2006 a new government agency named the
Overseas Singaporean Unit (OSU) was established under the Prime Minister’s Office. It
took over the secondary mission of Contact Singapore to reach out more proactively to
overseas Singaporeans and facilitate return migration. The OSU organizes professional
networking activities for overseas Singaporeans and an annual festival known as ‘Sin-
gapore Day’ in different global cities to celebrate Singaporean culture and remind
overseas Singaporeans of the homeland.2 The event receives significant media coverage
in Singapore. The OSU website further allows overseas Singaporeans to exchange
information and opinions about life abroad and missing home.
Contact Singapore, and later OSU, offices around the world were set up to organize
events, mobilize overseas Singaporean communities and create key activity nodes with
connectivity to Singapore. Figure 1 below illustrates the geographical spread of overseas
Singaporean communities as identified on the OSU website. Some regions, like north-
east Asia and Europe, have a stronger overseas Singaporean presence than others (such
as Africa). Within a region, certain countries also have denser nodes of connectivity to
Singapore. For example, Figure 2 depicts the density of networks linking China to
Singapore through the presence of overseas Singaporean communities. Through these
material and virtual ways, the imaginary of a Singaporean diaspora landscape comes
into existence.
The diaspora strategies implemented by the Singaporean state aim to achieve two
goals. First, it extends nation building extraterritorially by cultivating a sense of commu-
nity and national identity amongst Singaporeans abroad. Singaporeans abroad are
regularly reminded of their ties and obligations to Singapore. For example, PrimeMinister
Lee Hsien Loong addressed a group of overseas Singaporeans in Perth by saying, ‘You are
part of an information network for us because [. . .] you knowwhat’s happening in your
own countries, and if you keep in touchwith Singapore as well, thenwewill benefit from
your antenna and tentacles’ (The Straits Times, 2009b). Such reminders serve to mobilize
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the contributions of overseas Singaporeans for economic and nation-building purposes.
Second, and of particular interest to this paper, are the efforts to capitalize upon overseas
Singaporeans to spur development of a higher order than the remittance industry and
other financial transfers normally associated with development. As Kuznetsov and Sabel
(2006: 3) observe of the tangible and intangible benefits presented by the international
mobility of talent:
Expatriates do not need to be investors or make financial contributions to have an impact on
their home countries. They can serve as “bridges” by providing access to markets, sources of
investment, and expertise. Influential members of diasporas can shape public debate, articulate
reform plans, and help implement reforms and new projects. Policy expertise and managerial
and marketing knowledge are the most significant resources of diaspora networks.
While the case studies in the above edited volume by Kuznetsov (2006) focus on
‘developing economies’, the same observations about mobilizing the human capital
embodied in nationals abroad can be made of the diaspora strategies taken up by a
growing number of high-income and middle-income countries. In their view, the
knowledge represented by emigrants form ‘epistemic networks’ (Faist, 2008: 31), where
ideas are exchanged in a club-like manner: members can access the potential spin-offs
of knowledge appropriation, while nonmembers are excluded. In the next section, we
bring the Singaporean case into dialogue with the four critiques of diaspora-centred
development raised earlier in this paper.
Reflections on Singapore’s diaspora strategies to date
The diaspora strategies of the Singaporean state gained momentum only in recent years.
While it may be too early to make definitive judgments on Singapore’s performance
relative to these four areas of concern, we can make preliminary observations. Our
intention here is to use the four critical strands sketched out above to mark out the
specificities of the Singaporean case when set into global relief and propose how the
Singaporean case informs critical literature on diaspora strategies.
Intellectual bases of the agenda
State technocrats mediate Singapore’s entry into the global economy and embrace
a developmental model that has evolved over time. Singapore has positioned itself
sequentially as a magnet for FDI in labour-intensive low-technology manufacturing and
assembly functions (during the 1960s and 1970s); as a leading destination for higher-
value-added, capital-intensive TNC investment inmanufacturing (during the 1980s) and
research and development (during the 1990s); and finally as a global city for the world’s
leading financial services and TNCs (from 2000 onwards). Singapore’s muscular devel-
opmental state and recent shift in emphases from localizing global capital to globalizing
local capital has furnished it with an approach to DKN which is both unique and
problematic.
Diaspora strategies are often framed as governmental strategies pursued by
neoliberalizing states bent on securing global competitive advantage by tapping the
expertise of expatriate communities (Larner, 2007; Ragazzi, 2009; Mullings, 2012).
They furnish sending states with ‘soft power’, ‘human capital’, ‘social capital’ and
‘network capacity’. The Singaporean political leadership projects a clear intellectual
and political vision when it invokes the diaspora as a potential agent of development.
References to the ‘knowledge economy’, the ‘smart economy’, ‘social capital led devel-
opment’ and so on are all set into the context of a development logic that seeks to
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move home-grown Singaporean industries further up the value chain and onto the
international stage. Fostering DKN improves the capacity of indigenous firms to
compete in the international market, through knowledge transfer, mentoring,
brokering of contacts, provision of advice and so on. For example, in 2009 Singapore
Telecommunications Ltd (Singtel) welcomed the return of a prominent overseas Sin-
gaporean as a member of its senior leadership, highlighting that ‘his keen understand-
ing of the industry is a boost to our efforts to grow our business overseas even as we
consolidate our position as the leading service provider in the Singapore ICT market’
(Singtel, 2009). In a newspaper interview, former Minister for Manpower Gan Kim
Yong commended this example of a successful returning Singaporean (My Paper,
2010). When situated in wider state-sponsored discourses, including other pronounce-
ments by the manpower minister (and his successors) on the importance of ‘keep[ing]
in contact with [overseas Singaporeans so] they will continue to contribute to the
country’ (The Straits Times, 2009a), the Singtel example usefully illustrates the intel-
lectual bases of a diaspora strategy agenda that aims to promote a viable home-grown
knowledge economy through the human and social capital embodied by returnees
who can mobilize global diaspora knowledge networks.
However, probing questions concerning the intellectual foundations of the diaspora
strategies, as we highlighted earlier in this paper, can be directed to examine whether
the type of subjectivity cultivated through diaspora strategies resonates with the intel-
lectual bases of the vision projected by political leadership. In studying Singapore’s
initiatives to develop the biomedical sector, Holden and Demeritt (2008) suggest that the
state endorses international bioethical guidance but sidelines the tacit liberalism, which
is at odds with the paternalistic political culture and citizenship norms of the city-state.
In another sector identified for developing Singapore’s knowledge-based economy,
innovation and entrepreneurship are supported through policy, but the political lead-
ership remains cautious at the governance level. This creates a situation where ‘inno-
vation and entrepreneurship are encouraged but restricted within certain spaces and
regulated by certain parameters’ (Ng, 2012: 344). The uncertain bases of these sectors
identified for diaspora strategizing have a bearing on whether recruiting members of the
diaspora or returnees can help promote a viable home-grown knowledge economy for
Singapore. The balance that the Singaporean state seeks to attain, namely ‘centralised
decentralisation’ (Ng, 2012), is qualitatively different from the case of China where, as
Meyer (2011) observes, multiple organizations at different levels of governance along-
side private sector actors and associations have proliferated for diaspora engagement,
creating interstitial spaces for competition, collaboration and other creative initiatives.
Of course this is not to imply that developmental states cannot work with such ideas as
innovation, entrepreneurialism, social capital, soft power and networks; only that the
intellectual bases through which such work might be carried out sit awkwardly with
thinking on diaspora strategies which assumes less state-centric and more neoliberal
forms of global competition. As we show below, the lingering centralization approach
found in Singapore impacts the nature of stakeholder alignment during diaspora
strategizing.
State infrastructure and stakeholder alignment
Given its history as a developmental state, it is unsurprising that Singapore has adopted
a top-down and technocratic approach towards diaspora engagement. Policy makers
focus on carnival-like events such as the Singapore Day celebrations or use smaller-
scale dialogue sessions to engage Singaporean associations, international students,
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professionals, business leaders and other creative specialists abroad. These initiatives are
similar to what countries like India and China have done for diaspora engagement
(Mani & Varadarajan, 2005; Zweig, 2006). But it is equally true that Singapore has not
rushed to invent a new coterie of expensive and cumbersome institutions for diaspora
strategizing. At times it has invested in costly and high-profile infrastructure and events,
yet it refrains from creating an entirely new ministry of diaspora or dedicating resources
for diaspora strategizing to the same extent as India or China. Nonetheless, Singapore’s
diaspora strategizing faces a different set of paradoxical challenges.
Interviews with informants suggest that although the OSU acts as a coordinating
body for interagency activities related to the Singaporean diaspora (such as in foreign
relations, business, education or cultural development), there are difficulties developing
meaningful and sustainable cooperation amongst government partners who have dif-
ferent vested interests. Rather than mobilizing DKN fruitfully as set out in the intellec-
tual vision of the political leadership, the policy makers have taken the less contentious
path of directing their publicity efforts and resources at cultural activities. Yet, viewed
from the outside, it appears that the state has been centralizing diaspora engagement,
which impacts the autonomy exercised by diaspora groups external to the state and
their sense of stakeholdership. International experience shows that state-led diaspora
strategies benefit from enlisting external stakeholders that are part of the diaspora (e.g.,
hometown associations) and organizations that see the value of engaging with the
diaspora for pecuniary (e.g., business and employment opportunities) or nonpecuniary
reasons (e.g., cultivating a national community abroad).
Stakeholders in Singapore’s case would be cultural communities, alumni networks
and nonstate or NGOs that address diaspora interests. The state’s approach has been to
incorporate the activities of external organizations under its umbrella. For example, the
OSU enlists Singaporean student societies and associations in its mission to engage with
overseas Singaporeans. They receive funding from the OSU to carry out their social
activities. The OSU also launched seed funding for independent groups of Singaporeans
to spearhead events celebrating Singaporean culture, heritage and community
(Overseas Singaporean Unit, 2014). A separate pot of money is disbursed from another
government agency based in Singapore to target youths as stakeholders. However, these
government agencies, societies and associations are criticized by some Singaporeans,
within and outside of the country, for being too closely aligned with the agenda of the
Singaporean political leadership (see Ho, 2009). The top-down governance style char-
acteristic of the Singaporean political leadership and bureaucracy has resulted in
ambivalent attitudes towards the extension of the state’s presence extraterritorially.
Enabling independent stakeholders to engage freely with the Singaporean diaspora
could lend greater credibility to the diaspora strategies encouraged by the state.
As an example, we refer to nongovernmental3 initiatives by the Singapore Interna-
tional Foundation (SIF), which predated the establishment of the OSU. The SIF formerly
organized annual summer camps for children of overseas Singaporeans returning for
visits. The camps familiarized the children with Singaporean history, culture and school
life through a buddy programme with local students. The SIF also published an online
magazine for overseas Singaporeans. However the summer camps have ceased since
2009, and the magazine has changed its focus to expatriates communities in Singapore
instead. As an NGO, the SIF has significant credibility with overseas Singaporeans that
prefer to distance themselves from the state. Informant interviews suggest that as the
Singaporean state became more interested in its diaspora, the activities of NGOs reach-
ing out to the diaspora gradually became directly or indirectly curtailed (e.g., through
174 Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho and Mark Boyle
funding constraints or advice to restructure their activities to minimize overlapping
agenda with the state). This stifles the potential for recalibrating perceptions of regi-
mentation in Singaporean governance and society that could have contributed to
emigration decisions in the first place (Ho, 2009).
The visible centralization and technocratic efficiency of Singapore’s diaspora engage-
ment policy sideline other social actors and constrains, instead of nurturing productive
homeland-diaspora relationships. Here, lessons may be extracted from Ireland’s
approach towards diaspora engagement, which lightly incubates existing networks
rather than create new institutions to govern the diaspora. The Irish government
recognizes that the most sustainable diaspora-homeland ties are those that emerge
organically, and that state-led initiatives often fizzle out after a period of initial jubila-
tion. The role of the state is to seed, incubate and energize diaspora engagement
schemes launched by other stakeholders (Boyle & Kitchin, 2008). Ireland’s approach is
also supported by Meyer’s (2011) study of diaspora engagement in India and China
where a larger number of heterogeneous actors interacting with one another results in
more effective diaspora networks than in the case of Colombia and South Africa. These
international examples show that involving plural stakeholders can effect more produc-
tive diaspora engagement. Following from that, cultivating meaningful stakeholdership
also means respecting the various interests represented within the diaspora and nur-
turing wider social inclusion, which we discuss next.
Cultural exclusion or inclusion
Thus far Singapore’s diaspora strategies emphasize knowledge mobilization to generate
scientific and technological innovations, trade and investments; this approach privileges
certain globally mobile knowledge communities over others (Coe & Bunnell, 2003).
Current knowledge mobilization initiatives focus narrowly on business leaders, profes-
sionals and international students, but they can be expanded to include other expatriate
groups. For example, ethnographic and interview-based fieldwork conducted with
overseas Singaporeans in London suggest that transient professionals pursue career
development and benefit most from the professional networking platforms organized by
the Singaporean associations. However, Singaporean families (where one or both
spouses have Singaporean citizenship) who plan to settle abroad, or have transnational
sojourning plans, are more keen to engage Singaporean policy makers in reconsidering
the dual citizenship restriction and national service requirement that dissuades them
from retaining Singaporean citizenship or passing it to their children (Ho, 2008). These
legal restrictions associated with Singaporean citizenship exist in tension with the
programmes extended by the state to connect with the Singaporean diaspora. Set into
international context, Singapore is an anomaly (the other exception is China) compared
to countries that are engaging actively with their diasporas and now have recognized
dual citizenship (e.g., Scotland, Ireland and Canada) or implemented dual nationality4
(e.g., India).
Another axis defining cultural exclusion or inclusion pertains to the foreign-local
divide prominent in Singaporean society today (compare with Koh, 2015 in this issue,
concerning the bumiputra ethnic privilege connoted in Malaysia’s diaspora strategy).
Singaporeans regard immigrants sceptically, even when these ‘foreign talents’ represent
Singapore at international events. Such Singaporeans believe that foreigners who apply
for permanent residency or citizenship status in the country, especially those from the
Asia region, are using Singapore as a stepping stone and they intend to remigrate to
other countries like the United States, Canada or Europe where it may be harder to do
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so on a Chinese or Indian passport. Immigration tensions are becoming more prominent
in Singapore (Liu, 2014). Yet immigrants can be potentially considered part of a wider
Singaporean diaspora even after they remigrate from Singapore. The limited size of the
Singaporean diaspora coupled with the nature of geographical dispersal means that
compared to countries with populous diasporas such as Ireland, India and China,
Singapore lacks a critical mass of actors to incubate its DKN prominently and develop
synergy with complementary knowledge industries. The professional and business ties
of foreigners who claim legal or social attachments to Singapore represent a potential
resource to the country, but this constituency known as the affinity diaspora (Ancien
et al., 2009) or elective diaspora (Jöns et al., 2014) has been neglected thus far in policy
debates, perhaps because it is considered an issue too sensitive to raise in view of
popular contestations towards the Singaporean state’s pro-immigration stance.
In comparison, Japan’s diaspora engagement policy recognizes that foreigners who
have lived in the country can play an ambassadorial role even after they leave. While
Japan’s immigration barriers deter foreign nationals from long-term settlement
(D’Costa, 2008), cultural initiatives like the Japan Exchange Teaching (JET) Programme,
which is coadministered by several government departments and organizations, brings
foreigners to Japan for international exchange and cultivates affinity ties. Yamashiro
(2012) argues that the JET Programme encourages former JET participants to direct
their experiences towards enhancing relations between their home countries and Japan.
Meanwhile Scotland’s diaspora strategy is even more inclusive. It comprises ‘returning
Scots’ who have come back to Scotland; ‘new Scots’ who are about to leave Scotland;
‘live diaspora’ comprising individuals who were born in Scotland or have worked or
studied in Scotland and are now living outside of Scotland; ‘ancestral diaspora’ which
refers to individuals of Scottish descent; and ‘affinity diaspora’ incorporating individuals
with a direct or indirect connection to Scotland but with no genealogical link to the
country (Ancien et al., 2009). Similarly, in a report written for the Asia Pacific Founda-
tion concerning Canada’s emerging diaspora strategy, Boyle and Kitchin (2011) recom-
mend that former immigrants and overseas students are a potential diaspora resource
for the country (also see Ho & Ley, 2014). Like these countries, Singapore experiences
considerable immigration but the definition of the Singaporean diaspora limits cultural
inclusion to those that consider it their natal country or who have legal status as
permanent residents or citizens.
Development for whom?
Finally, more work remains to be done to map the development outcomes of diaspora-
centred development for different social groups in Singapore. While significant attention
has been paid in the media and political rhetoric to the nation-building benefits of
engaging the diaspora, the tangible socio-economic and other impacts of diaspora
strategies for Singapore’s development have yet to be studied systematically. A common
theme observed by scholars who study the proceedings of diaspora conferences, such as
Mani and Varadarajan (2005) for India or Mullings (2011) for Jamaica, indicate that
issues pertaining to finance, business and investment are given prominence over
those concerning welfare and social justice. While the Singaporean state emphasizes
nationhood and national unity at the signature Singapore Day celebrations, its
interest in the diaspora is still framed around creating professional and business
opportunities for the knowledge-based economy rather than addressing concretely the
concerns of members of the diaspora about the educational pressure on young chil-
dren or the rising costs of healthcare in Singapore, which might have precipitated
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emigration decisions in the first place or are contributing to intentions to remain
overseas. These social reproduction issues are shared by Singaporeans living in the
city-state as well and if considered jointly with the concerns of the Singaporean dias-
pora, could direct attention towards a set of priorities different from economic devel-
opment.
Notwithstanding the opportunities presented by the diaspora for redirecting the
nature of development, we must also acknowledge the potential tensions brought up by
engaging with the diaspora. Given the extent of state revenue and resources invested in
the Singaporean diaspora, has engaging the diaspora resulted in a talent pool to fill
senior leadership positions for Singaporean industries? Which are the industries that
have benefited from the links made with overseas Singaporeans through diaspora
strategies? How have these industries and links created opportunities for those who
remain in Singapore? The answers to these questions are not easily derived from the
nascent knowledge base available about the Singaporean diaspora and the effects of
diaspora engagement. More generally, as with the case of diaspora engagement in other
countries (Seguin et al., 2006; Meyer, 2011), the impacts of policies are neither easily
traceable nor quantifiable given the geographical dispersal of the subjects of study (i.e.,
diaspora populations); the multiple actors involved (e.g., government agencies, private
corporations and formal and informal expatriate associations); the heterogeneous
industries implicated in diaspora strategizing; and the intangible quality of knowledge
sharing and networking spin-offs.
More apparent now are concerns over how the return of overseas Singaporeans is
perceived as competition for locally educated Singaporeans that lack international work
experience. A special feature in the national broadsheet in 2008 interviewed several
returnees who shared the difficulties they faced reintegrating into Singaporean society.
Amongst them, one said, ‘[I was] confronted with hostility . . . people felt threatened by
my overseas experience’, while another felt that ‘you have to learn how to deal with
people all over again. It is very easy to rub people the wrong way’ (The Straits Times,
2008). The state’s attention directed now at attracting the return of overseas Singapor-
eans to take up or groom them for senior leadership roles exacts another pressure point
on local Singaporeans that aspire towards such positions at the workplace but feel
doubly marginalized by the ‘foreign talent’ and ‘returning Singaporean talent’. Whether
at the personal, industry or national levels, what needs to be asked is whether diaspora
centred development is doing more than simply consolidating socio-economic inequali-
ties (Pellerin & Mullings, 2013).
The four areas of concern discussed above inform one another during the policy
materialization of diaspora strategizing. But more importantly, they enable us to build
up an argument excavating the development logics and outcomes of Singapore’s dias-
pora strategies by highlighting the tensions and contradictions arising. In the con-
cluding section, we elaborate on this and draw out the wider lessons derived from our
analyses.
Conclusion
By examining Singapore’s diaspora strategies and comparing them with international
examples, this paper has shown that, on the one hand, the Singaporean case is under-
girded by development logics similar to other economically advanced economies (espe-
cially in regard to its prioritization of diaspora knowledge networks). On the other hand,
it has favoured a technocratic and narrow approach towards diaspora strategizing that
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may run counter to the intellectual vision of mobilizing diaspora knowledge networks.
Set against the international literature debating the intellectual bases, ethics and
approaches of diaspora strategies (Meyer, 2001; Bauder, 2003; McGregor, 2008;
Mullings, 2011), the Singaporean case highlights the dissonances undermining the
anticipated benefits from hefty investments in diaspora strategizing. The paper demon-
strates how the Singaporean political leadership has repackaged development agenda to
emphasize diaspora-centred development for achieving competitive advantage in the
global knowledge-based economy. This approach is distinct from but linked to past
policies that pursued foreign direct investment and export-oriented trade. Diaspora
communities are being convened and mobilized to serve Singapore’s development
trajectory and entry to the global knowledge economy.
But the diaspora strategies materialized by the emigrant state infrastructure signal a
mixed sense of direction, as the muscular Singaporean state seeks to balance economic
decentralization associated with neoliberal forms of global competition against the
paternalistic governance style to which it is more accustomed. Accompanying the
top-down approach adopted towards diaspora strategizing have been efforts to incor-
porate formerly plural stakeholder groups within Singapore and abroad under the
umbrella of the Singaporean emigrant state infrastructure. This has jeopardized the
appeal and legitimacy of diaspora strategies, as the paternalism of the state is reinforced
to Singaporeans abroad who may desire greater autonomy. The wider lesson here
is the importance of considering the compatibility of political and societal culture with
messages of decentralization and autonomy normally associated with diaspora knowl-
edge networks. In other words, the context specificity of place and culture deserves
more careful treatment in both the study and application of diaspora strategies
internationally.
Through the case of Singapore, we also observed that diaspora knowledge mobili-
zation tends to prioritize economic development agenda over other socio-political issues
important to overseas Singaporeans, such as the dual citizenship restriction, the national
service requirement, escalating healthcare costs in Singapore or the educational pres-
sure placed on young children and parents. However, researching diaspora strategies
and informing diaspora engagement with the appropriate conceptual tools can contrib-
ute towards reconceptualizing development agenda and extant notions of diaspora
belonging. By examining the Singaporean experience through critiques of migration as
development and critical diaspora studies, we suggest that diaspora populations can
facilitate a more progressive social development agenda by demanding policy responses
to social reproduction concerns shared by the resident population as well.
Further, diaspora engagement presents an opportunity to reconceptualize narrow
definitions of nation, community and belonging (Mani & Varadarajan, 2005; Mohan,
2006). Against a backdrop of growing anti-immigration sentiments in Singaporean
society, the option of engaging overseas Singaporeans and fostering return migration
has proven to be politically palatable. The paper highlighted however the limited
sustainability of diaspora strategizing if it is restricted to Singaporeans that consider the
country their natal home. Instead we introduce the notion and value of an affinity
diaspora (Ancien et al., 2009) whose members, despite the absence of natal roots, claim
biographical ties with a country and decide to be part of its diaspora and networks (Jöns
et al., 2014). This intervention troubles claims to diaspora belonging that are premised
on primordial attachments or ethnonationalism, thus extending the possibility for a
more inclusive approach towards not only diaspora strategizing but also wider debates
on immigrant belonging.
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By examining the case of Singapore, this paper contributes to a growing literature
critically examining the logics, efficacy and sustainability of diaspora strategizing. It is in
view of these deliberations that we remain cautious of celebrating the merits of diaspora
strategizing. As discussed here, systematic analyses of the benefits and spin-offs derived
from diaspora strategies in the long run are still needed to ascertain the economic, social
and political implications of diaspora-centred development. Inasmuch as diaspora strat-
egies and DKN may promise development outcomes, interrogating the logics, assump-
tions and approaches of diaspora strategies is necessary to weigh up carefully what is
increasingly becoming a policy mantra for both emerging and economically advanced
economies.
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Endnotes
1 These include the World Bank through its ‘Knowledge for Development Programme’; the
International Diaspora Engagement Alliance (IDEA) established by Hilary Clinton via the
Secretary of State’s Office of the Global Partnership Initiative (GPI), in collaboration with
the Migration Policy Institute (MPI); the joint European Union (EU) and United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) Migrant for Development (M4D) programme; and the advo-
cacy work undertaken by among others the MPI, Economist Magazine, MacArthur Foundation,
the Inter-American Bank and Diaspora Matters Consultancy.
2 Past events have taken place in places like New York (2007), Melbourne (2008), London (2009)
and Shanghai (2011) where there are substantive numbers of overseas Singaporeans.
3 Although some observers argue that the SIF started as a government-organized NGO
(GONGO), the SIF has managed to tread the fine line of maintaining separation from the state
(Krishna & Khondker, 2004).
4 Dual nationality confers a more limited set of rights than dual citizenship. For example, the
Overseas Citizenship of India scheme does not allow the bearer to vote or stand for political
office. There are also limited land rights.
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